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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order on March 23, 2009.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Plaintiff has asserted in his appellate brief that there are two issues presented for
review on appeal. Defendant asserts that that these two issues are not reflective of the
issue that Plaintiff was given permission to appeal. The only issue on appeal is as
follows:
I.

Was it error for the trial court to require Plaintiffs treating
medical providers to provide Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert reports
detailing their opinions regarding causation of injury and
prognosis of Plaintiff and their qualifications and expertise on
which those opinions are based?

The trial court granted Defendant's Motion in Limine Objecting to Plaintiffs
Designation of Experts on the grounds that because Plaintiffs treating medical providers
intended to provide testimony on causation of Plaintiff s injuries and prognosis beyond
the scope of their personal knowledge and observations obtained during treatment, they
are required under the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT
App 303, to provide a report detailing their expert opinions and their qualifications and
expertise to make such opinions.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper interpretation for a rule of procedure is a question of law. The Utah
Supreme Court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness. See Ostler v. Buhler,
1999UT99,*{5.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 26(a)(3)(A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be
used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 203, 205 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Rule 26 (a)(3)(B), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure:
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involved giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared
and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which
the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness
within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony;
and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years.
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence (Testimony by Experts):
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert
testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
2

(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or
methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the
relevant expert community.
Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence (Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts):
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
Rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence (Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert
Opinion):
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without
prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on crossexamination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises out of a motorcycle/motor vehicle accident that occurred on or

about October 7, 2005. Plaintiff filed a Complaint for injuries and damages related to the
accident on or about September 1, 2006. (Record on Appeal, 1-3.)
B.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition of the Trial Court:
On or about June 13, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Designation of Expert Witnesses in

which he designated his treating medical providers as experts who will offer opinions
regarding causation of injury and prognosis. (Record on Appeal, 188-190.) On or about
July 9, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine Objecting to Plaintiffs Designation of
3

Expert Witnesses. The basis for Defendant's motion was as follows: "Plaintiffs
designation of his treating physicians is improper if he intends to have them testify to
anything beyond the scope of actual treatment, including testimony regarding prognosis,
future medical costs and causation of injuries. Each of those items goes far beyond the
scope of actual treatment. If Plaintiff intends to call his treating physician as experts,
under Utah law, he would then have to produce an expert report detailing the expert
provider's opinions." (Record on Appeal, 204-209.)
On or about July 23, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposing memorandum in which he
argued that because his treating medical providers were not retained or specially
employed as witnesses for trial, they are not subject to Rule 26(a)(3)(B). (Record on
Appeal, 219-224.) On or about October 24, 2007, the trial court issued a Minute Entry
granting Defendant's Motion in Limine. (Record on Appeal, 170-172.)
On or about September 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order on the trial court's ruling granting Defendant's Motion in Limine.
An order granting Plaintiffs interlocutory request was granted by the Utah Supreme
Court on or about December 5, 2008. (Record on Appeal, 392.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
With respect to Defendant's arguments in opposition to the brief filed by Plaintiff,
Defendant contends that the trial court correctly analyzed and applied the Utah Court of
Appeals' ruling in Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, to the instant case when it
required Plaintiffs treating medical providers to provide expert reports detailing their
4

opinions regarding causation of injury and prognosis along with their qualifications and
expertise for offering such opinions.
Testimony from Plaintiffs treating providers that the subject accident was the
direct and exclusive cause of Plaintiff s injuries must be accompanied by a report
detailing the foundation for that opinion and the expertise and qualifications on which the
opinion is based. Such is necessary because an opinion as to the direct and exclusive
cause of Plaintiff s injuries is potentially a biomechanical opinion requiring evaluation of
the vehicles involved in the accident, impact speeds, G-forces, and all other
investigations necessary for a biomechanical report.
Without an expert report detailing Plaintiffs treating providers' opinions
regarding causation, Defendant has no way of determining whether Plaintiffs treating
providers have the necessary expertise and qualifications to offer the opinion. Defendant
is left to depose each and every treating provider to determine what their testimony will
be and then whether they have any biomechanical expertise to offer the opinion on
causation. This is costly and time prohibitive in comparison to requiring Plaintiffs
treating providers to either provide a report detailing their qualifications for offering such
opinions or obtaining a stipulation from Plaintiff that his treating providers will only
testify as to their personal knowledge and observations.
Therefore, because the trial court correctly analyzed and applied law set forth in
Pete v. Youngblood, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs
treating medical providers must provide Defendant with Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert reports
5

and disclosures if they intend to testify on causation of injury and prognosis beyond
personal knowledge and observations obtained during treatment.
With respect to Defendant's arguments in opposition to the amicus brief filed by
UAJ, it is Defendant's contention that in Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, U 14,
the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the substance-based approach when it held "[a]
treating physician who has formulated opinions going beyond what is necessary to
provide appropriate care for the injured party steps into the shoes of a retained expert for
purposes of Rule 26(a)(2)."
The substance-based approach adopted by the Utah Court of Appeals in
Youngblood specifies that if the injured party's treating providers intend to provide
testimony that is not based on their personal knowledge and observations obtained during
course of care and treatment, then an expert report must be provided detailing their
opinions on those issues and their expertise and qualifications for offering such
testimony. Causation of injury and prognosis fall into the category of opinion testimony
that is outside the scope of their personal knowledge and observations obtained during
treatment because it is testimony going directly to biomechanical and reconstruction
issues unrelated to treatment.
It is clear that the only just and fair way to evaluate whether an expert steps in to
the shoes of a retained expert and is required to provide a report detailing the opinions
and the foundation for those opinions is to look to the substance of the expert's
testimony. Merely looking to the expert's status will often result in a fundamentally
6

unfair, time consuming, and costly situation that will force adverse parties to depose all
designated treating providers who intend to testify on causation of injury and prognosis,
or anything else that is beyond the scope of their personal knowledge and observations
obtained through treatment.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF Error! Bookmark not
defined.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ANALYZED AND
APPLIED THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IN
PETE v. YOUNGBLOOD TO THE INSTANT CASE WHEN IT
REQUIRED PLAINTIFF'S TREATING MEDICAL
PROVIDERS TO PROVIDE EXPERT REPORTS
DETAILING THEIR OPINIONS REGARDING CAUSATION
OF INJURY AND PROGNOSIS ALONG WITH THEIR
QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERTISE FOR OFFERING
SUCH OPINIONS.

Rule 26(a)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires disclosure of any
witness who may provide expert testimony pursuant to Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Plaintiff filed a Designation of Expert Witnesses complying
with Rule 26(a)(3)(A). (Record on Appeal, 188-189.) Defendant filed a Motion in
Limine Objecting to Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses on the grounds that
because Plaintiffs treating physicians intended to give opinions regarding causation and
prognosis, Plaintiffs treating physicians would be providing testimony beyond the scope
of actual treatment. Such testimony, according to Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App
303, puts Plaintiffs treating physicians into the same position as a retained expert and
requires a report and qualification disclosures under U.R.C.P. 21(a)(3)(B).
7
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A.

Youngblood classifies all treating providers who intend to testify
beyond the scope of their personal knowledge and observations
obtained through treatment as retained experts.

Defendant submits that Youngblood stands for the proposition that treating
physicians must comply with Rule 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
when offering opinions going beyond personal knowledge and observations obtained
during treatment, including testimony regarding causation of injury and prognosis.
Paragraph 14 of the Youngblood decision provides the context for the issue being
appealed. The Youngblood court concluded:
If, however, the treating physician also offers an opinion as to the standard
of care or whether that standard has been breached, the testimony is no
longer simply factual. "In order to determine if an expert need be identified
before trial, [r]ule 26 focuses not on the status of the witness, but rather on
the substance of the testimony." Id. at 218; see also Hansen v. Cent. Iowa
Hosp. Corp., 686 N.W.2d 476, 483 (Iowa 2004) ("Thus, even treating
physicians may come within the parameters of [the Iowa version of rule 26]
when they begin to assume a role in the litigation analogous to that of a
retained expert."); Smithv.Paiz, 2004 WY 14, 84 P.3d 1272, 1275-76
(Wyo. 2004) ("[Treating physicians'] status depends on the content of their
testimony: If they only testify as to what they observed and did within the
physician-patient relationship, then they would be fact witnesses; if, in
addition to testifying to the facts, the treating physicians offered an opinion,
then they would be expert witnesses."). Because the treating physician in
Patel was asked to opine as to the general medical standard in the
community, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that
this was "classic" expert testimony requiring disclosure of the treating
physician as an expert witness. Patel 984 F.2d at 218; see also Thomas v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Mass. 1996) (requiring disclosure
and an expert report where treating physician offered opinion on causation
and prognosis); Hansen, 686 N.W.2d at 482 (stating that physician is not
ordinarily required to formulate an opinion about the standard of care in
treating a patient); Smith, 84 P.3d at 1277 (requiring disclosure and an
expert report where treating physician offered opinion testimony on
diagnoses, prognosis, and causation). "[A] treating physician who has
formulated opinions going beyond what was necessary to provide
8

appropriate care for the injured party steps into the shoes of a retained
expert for purposes of [r]ule 26(a)(2)." Thomas, 169 F.R.D. at 2-3; see also
Washington v. Arapahoe County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 197 F.R.D. 439, 44142 (D. Colo. 2000).
The only difference between Youngblood and the instant case is that Youngblood
discussed the necessity of designating a treating provider as an expert if the plaintiff
intended his treating provider to testify as to the standard of care in a medical malpractice
case. Rule 26 (c)(3) does not distinguish between treating providers testimony on
causation and prognosis in the context of a medical malpractice case versus a personal
injury case. Thus, this Court should not conclude that there is a distinction either.
Nonetheless, testimony as to the standard of care in medical malpractice cases is
substantially the same as the causation and prognosis testimony Plaintiffs treating
providers intend to offer in the instant case. In both cases, the treating providers are
offering testimony beyond the scope of their personal knowledge and observations
obtained during treatment. Testimony as to the standard of care in a medical malpractice
case and as to causation of injury and prognosis in a personal injury case goes far beyond
what is necessary to provide appropriate care for the injured party.
B.

Retained experts are required to provide reports under Rule
26(a)(3)(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-

It is necessary for a treating provider in each type of case to provide a Rule
26(a)(3)(B) report to set forth precisely what their opinions will be regarding the standard
of care in a medical malpractice cases or causation of injury and prognosis in personal
injury cases for several reasons. First, such information is not included in medical
9

records related to the injured party's treatment. Second, and more importantly, the report
will set forth the treating provider's qualifications and expertise to testify on the standard
of care or causation of injury and prognosis. Without a report, the adverse party's only
option is depose each and every treating physician who is designated to testify, which in
many cases would result in significant extra time and costs. Merely designating a
treating provider to testify on causation of injury and prognosis pursuant to Rule
26(a)(3)(A) will not provide the adverse party with information about the provider's
qualifications and expertise, and such information is not to be found in treatment records.
This puts the adverse party at a distinct and unfair disadvantage. Such is the reality of the
instant case.
Taking the depositions of every treating provider of a plaintiff is unreasonable and
cumbersome in comparison to requiring Plaintiff to produce an expert report listing the
foundational qualifications for his treating physicians on causation of injury and
prognosis. It is especially unreasonable in large personal injury cases in which an injured
party may have dozens of treating providers who intend to testify on causation of injury
and prognosis.
C.

Because testimony from Plaintiffs treating providers in
causation of injury and prognosis is specialized knowledge
beyond the personal knowledge and observation of the
providers, it is necessary for the providers to set forth their
qualifications under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
10

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve
as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other
principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing
that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii)
have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
In the instant case, without an expert report from Plaintiffs treating physicians as to the
basis of their opinions regarding causation of injury and prognosis, Defendant is left to
guess as to whether Plaintiffs treating providers have the biomechanical expertise to
testify that Plaintiffs injuries were the direct result of the subject accident.
Biomechanical testimony is scientific, technical testimony that requires a threshold
showing of reliability and that the expert testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.
Defendant suspects that Plaintiffs treating providers do not have the biomechanical
expertise necessary to offer such opinions, but Defendant has no way of knowing if no
report is provided, other than to take each and every treating provider's deposition. The
prohibitive cost of deposing each and every treating physician designated in this manner
would be easily overcome by having the providers produce a report detailing their
opinions and their qualifications for providing such opinions. Defendant would then be
able to evaluate the expert's opinions, and their qualifications and expertise to determine
whether it is necessary to present the issue to the trial court in the form of a Rule 702
motion to exclude the expert's causation and prognosis testimony or not.
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It is apparently Plaintiffs position that adverse parties should be forced to depose
every treating provider designated to provide causation and prognosis testimony in what
amounts to a game of "hide and seek" to learn the provider's opinions and qualifications
because it is inconvenient and costly for the treating provider to have to draft a report and
provide the information required for a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) disclosure. It is vital to
remember in the instant case that Defendant did not initiate this lawsuit. Plaintiff is
seeking substantial amounts for his personal injuries and related damages. It is Plaintiff
who has the burden of proof and is required to prosecute his case. If Plaintiff intends to
have his treating providers give testimony going beyond their personal knowledge and
observations obtained during Plaintiffs treatment, then Plaintiff should be required to
have those treating experts provide reports detailing their opinions and their
qualifications and expertise to offer such opinions.
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the role litigation plays in causation
testimony by treating providers when it found:
[T]he paramount criterion is whether the evidence, irrespective of whether
technically expert opinion testimony, relates to facts and opinions arrived at
by a physician in treating a patient or whether it represents expert opinion
testimony formulated for purposes of issues in pending or anticipated
litigation.
Hansen v. Cent. Iowa Hosp. Corp., 686 N.W.2d 476, 482 (Iowa 2004). In the instant
case, testimony from Plaintiffs treating providers that Plaintiffs injuries were directly
and exclusively the result of the subject accident goes far beyond opinions arrived at
during treatment. If those are the opinions of Plaintiff s treating providers, they have
12

been formulated by Plaintiffs treating providers entirely because of the subject litigation.
If they are qualified to render biomechanical opinions, then they should be forced to
provide expert reports detailing their qualifications to give blanket opinions regarding
causation of Plaintiff s injuries.
The Youngblood court held, and correctly understood, that any testimony going
beyond the personal knowledge and observations obtained during treatment of the injured
party, whether the treating provider is offering testimony as to the standard of care in a
medical malpractice case or testimony as to causation of injury and prognosis in a
personal injury case, steps into the shoes of a retained expert for purposes of Rule
26(a)(2). Retained experts are required to provide reports detailing their opinions and the
qualifications and expertise on which to those opinions are based.
D.

Plaintiff misapplies the majority view in the instant case because
it is unlikely that Plaintiffs treating providers have personal
knowledge that the subject accident was the direct and exclusive
cause of the Plaintiffs injuries.

Of further significance is Plaintiffs briefing regarding the majority view as to
whether treating medical providers are subject to reporting requirements when presented
to provide opinion testimony on standard of care in medical malpractice cases and
causation of injury and prognosis in personal injury cases. It is unlikely that Plaintiffs
treating providers have examined the vehicles involved in the subject accident,
determined impact speeds, or done any kind of accident reconstruction or biomechanical
analysis of the subject accident. Thus, though Plaintiffs treating medical providers have
personal knowledge that Plaintiff reported to them that he was injured in a
13

motorcycle/motor vehicle accident and that they treated him for injuries consistent with
his reports, they almost certainly do not have personal knowledge on which to base the
opinion that the subject accident was the direct and exclusive cause of Plaintiff s injuries.
Moreover, even if they had personal knowledge, the providers have to produce a report
and disclosure of qualifications if offering an opinion beyond their treatment. It is also
very likely that Plaintiffs treating providers possess very limited knowledge regarding
Plaintiffs prior medical history. Without such information and without undertaking an
accident reconstruction and/or a biomechanical analysis, Plaintiffs treating providers are
not qualified to opine that the subject accident was the direct and exclusive cause of
Plaintiffs injuries.
The jury in the instant case is likely to discount evidence of any other causes of
Plaintiffs injuries if Plaintiff s treating providers are permitted to testify that the subject
accident caused Plaintiffs injuries. The providers should be able to testify that Plaintiff
told them his injuries were caused by the subject accident and that their treatment of
Plaintiff was consistent with auto accident trauma being the possible cause. But,
testimony by the providers that Plaintiffs injuries were in their opinion caused by the
subject accident, to the exclusion of all other possible causes, is improper where
Plaintiffs treating providers have not undertaken a biomechanical analysis of the
accident or reviewed Plaintiffs medical history for pre-existing conditions. If they have
undertaken such an analysis, then they must produce a report detailing their opinions and
disclose their qualifications.
14

The issue would be resolved simply if Plaintiff was willing to stipulate that his
treating providers would testify only that Plaintiff told them that his injuries were the
result of the subject accident and that the injuries they treated were consistent with auto
accident trauma being a possible cause. Such testimony would have sufficient foundation
because it would be based on observations made through treatment of Plaintiff and would
thus be permissible under Youngblood. Otherwise, Defendant is left to depose any
treating providers designated as experts to testify on causation of injury and prognosis to
determine whether they have the biomechanical expertise to testify that the subject
accident was the direct and exclusive cause of Plaintiff s injuries, and whether they have
actually undertaken a biomechanical analysis if they are qualified to do so.
This Court is not being asked to decide the merits of Defendant's arguments
regarding whether Plaintiffs treating providers have the expertise necessary to offer such
opinions. Defendant is simply presenting these arguments to illustrate why it is
absolutely necessary for Plaintiffs treating providers to provide expert reports detailing
their opinions on causation as well as their qualifications and expertise. It is substantially
more cost effective and time productive to require an injured party's treating providers to
produce the expert reports than to force the adverse party to depose each and every
treating provider to learn what qualifications and expertise they have to testify on
causation of injury and prognosis. According to Youngblood, Plaintiff is required to
provide the information so that Defendant can evaluate whether Plaintiffs providers'
opinions on causation and prognosis have sufficient foundation.
15

E.

Without an expert report detailing the opinions and expertise of
Plaintiffs treating providers with respect to causation of injury,
Defendant is left to guess what the opinions will be and whether
the providers have the expertise to offer such opinions.

Finally, Plaintiff argues in his brief that the difference in contact and history
between Plaintiffs treating providers and Defendant's independent medical examiner,
Dr. Scott Knorpp, is a guiding principle behind the applications of subparts (A) and (B)
of Rule 26(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that
because Dr. Knorpp only saw Plaintiff on one occasion versus the numerous one-on-one
encounters Plaintiff had with his own treating providers, Dr. Knorpp is required to
provide a report and information regarding his qualifications and expertise so that
Plaintiff is not "left guessing as to the scope and intent of the Defendant's expert
witnesses who were retained or specially employed for trial." (Plaintiffs Brief, p. 14.)
Plaintiffs argument actually validates Defendant's arguments in support of
requiring Plaintiffs treating providers to produce an expert report and their qualifications
and expertise for testimony on causation of injury and prognosis. Dr. Knorpp's IME
report sets forth an opinion based on his expertise and his evaluation of Plaintiff s
medical records and history, as well as the expert report that he relied on by accident
reconstructionist Dr. E. Paul France. Plaintiff is not left to guess as to the opinions of Dr.
Knorpp because there is sufficient foundation for his opinions and he is qualified to make
such opinions. Plaintiff will surely attack those opinions at trial, and may even attempt to
do so with the opinions of his own treating providers, but there is no doubt that he knows
precisely what Dr. Knorpp's testimony will be and on what he bases his opinions.
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Conversely, without a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) report and disclosure, Defendant is left to
guess as to the foundation for Plaintiffs treating providers' testimony and if they are
going to testify that the subject accident was the direct and exclusive cause of Plaintiff s
alleged injuries. In order to have his treating providers opine that the subject accident
was the direct and exclusive cause of Plaintiff s injuries, Plaintiff must show that his
treating providers have the expertise to give the opinion and must have done the
investigative work as well.
Testimony as to the direct and exclusive cause of Plaintiff s injuries without
details about biomechanical expertise and without a biomechanical report goes far
beyond the treating provider's personal knowledge and observations obtained during the
course of care and treatment.
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE AMICUS BRIEF OF UTAH
ASSOCIATION OF JUSTICE
I.

PETE v. YOUNGBLOOD ADOPTED THE SUBSTANCEBASED APPROACH WHICH REQUIRES FULL
DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT OPINIONS.
A.

The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the substancebased approach in Pete v. Youngblood.

In Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, f 14, the Utah Court of Appeals
adopted the substance-based approach when it held "[a] treating physician who has
formulated opinions going beyond what is necessary to provide appropriate care for the
injured party steps into the shoes of a retained expert for purposes of Rule 26(a)(2)."
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(Emphasis added.) UAJ fails to even reference this language in its amicus brief. (See
UAJ Brief.)
Though the Youngblood case focused only on the issue of whether the plaintiff
was required to identify a treating physician as an expert witness, the Court of Appeals
went beyond that issue by adopting the substance-based approach to Rule 26 and holding
that if a treating physician intends to testify on issues outside the scope of their personal
knowledge and observations obtained during treatment, they become analogous to
retained experts under Rule 26(a)(3)(B) and must provide a report.
The substance-based approach adopted by the Utah Court of Appeals in
Youngblood is not nearly as complex as UAJ contends. If the injured party's treating
providers intend to provide testimony that is not based on their personal knowledge and
observations obtained during course of care and treatment, then an expert report must be
provided detailing their opinions on those issues and their expertise and qualifications for
offering such testimony. Causation of injury and prognosis fall into the category of
opinion testimony that is outside the scope of their personal knowledge and observations
obtained during treatment because it is testimony going directly to biomechanical and
reconstruction issues unrelated to treatment.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs treating medical providers were designated as
experts who will provide testimony that in their opinion the subject accident caused
Plaintiffs injuries. Because a treating provider can testify only to what they know from
their treatment and review of medical records, and what they have expertise about, to
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permit them to offer testimony that the subject accident was the sole and exclusive cause
of a plaintiff s injuries is to permit them to offer speculative testimony completely
lacking in foundation. The treating providers can tell the jury what a plaintiff told them
caused their injuries and that they provided treatment was for the injuries reported by the
plaintiff because that testimony is within the scope of observations obtained through
treatment. However, anything beyond the scope of treatment requires additional
information to establish expertise. Without demonstrating that they have a thorough
knowledge of the biomechanical issues or reconstruction, they cannot testify that the
subject accident was the exclusive cause of a plaintiff s injuries.
Adverse parties have no way of evaluating whether a treating provider has the
expertise to offer causation testimony without a report outlining their opinions and their
qualifications and expertise which is necessary to establish the foundation for the
opinions. Application of the substance-based rule is as straightforward as it is set forth in
Youngblood. The only thing required is that the following question be asked and
answered by the trial court: "Is the opinion based on the treating provider's personal
knowledge and observations obtained during treatment of the injured party?" If the
answer is 'yes', then no report is necessary. If the answer is 'no', then a report detailing
those opinions and the foundation for those opinions is required.
UAJ also asserts that the substance-based approach is problematic because it
cannot be applied to other specialized areas of knowledge. This argument is misplaced.
It is clear that under a substance-based approach, trial courts will simply consider
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whether the testimony being offered by the expert is within the scope of the expert's
personal knowledge. It is not complex or problematic. Courts have always played this
gate-keeper role as to expert testimony. Moreover, trial court's can better deal with
issues related to specialized areas of knowledge under the substance-based approach
because the expert's opinions have to be disclosed prior to trial. Dealing with such issues
is fundamentally much fairer than the alternative of allowing un-retained experts to
testify on any issue on which they choose merely because they are designated as unretained experts. That allows Plaintiff to hide opinions behind so-called "un-retained"
experts. In reality, these experts are being paid to provide treatment and to appear at trial
to testify. They should disclose their opinions. Simply permitting un-retained experts to
be designated to testify on any issue, some of which they are not qualified to testify to,
will result in problems at trial and will likely result in additional appellate activity. The
issue of whether an un-retained expert is qualified to offer an opinion that is beyond the
scope of the expert's personal knowledge should be resolved prior to trial. That cannot
be done if the expert is not required to establish their opinions and the foundation for the
opinions prior to trial.
UAJ claims that "practitioners" and district court judges hold a misperception that
Utah has already adopted the substance-based approach. (UAJ Brief, p. 6.) That is not
hard to imagine because Pete v. Youngblood adopted the substance-based approach.
When the Utah Court of Appeals held that the doctor in Youngblood failed to disclose
"specialized knowledge" on the standard of care, and upheld the striking of the doctor's
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affidavit, the court was applying the substance-based approach. If it was applying the
status-based approach, the doctor's affidavit would have been allowed into evidence
because the doctor was not a designated retained expert, which would have led to an
absurd result. Under the status-based approach, the treating provider could give the trier
of fact any opinion, without disclosure, simply because the provider was not a designated
retained expert.
UAJ is misplaced in arguing that the Tenth Circuit has rejected the substancebased approach to Rule 26. In Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007),
there was no indication that a prison clinical director planned to testify beyond the
prison's treatment of the patient. Thus, a report was not required. The court had no
reason to make an analysis as to the substance of the prison director's testimony because
the testimony was limited to actual treatment of the patient. In Adams v. Gateway, Inc.,
2006 WL 644848 (D. Utah 2006), a Utah Federal District Court issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Motion to Compel Dr. Adams' Expert Testimony and
Deposition. Because of the brief factual nature of the Court's opinion, it is impossible to
decipher the precise nature of Dr. Adams' opinions or whether the District Court even
evaluated applying a status-based or substance-based approach to Dr. Adams' opinions.
Moreover, it is clear from the opinion that Dr. Adams was deposed over a six-day period
during which Defendants would have been afforded ample opportunity to question Dr.
Adams regarding his expert opinions in the case. Such is not an issue in the instant case.
Defendant is trying to avoid undertaking the time and cost associated with deposing each
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and every treating medical provider who is designated as an un-retained expert by
Plaintiff. In fact, in its opinion, the Adams court notes that the notes to the 1993
amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure state that one of the reasons expert reports
are favored is because they eliminate the need for and the length of some depositions:
The 1993 Notes hint at the interplay between reports and expenses,
suggesting cost avoidance is a reason reports are required when expert
expenses are in play. In discussing the allocation of "the expense of such
depositions" to the party taking the deposition, the 1993 Notes suggest that
a report could "eliminate the need for some such depositions or at least
reduce the length of the depositions."
IdLat9.
Thus, contrary to UAJ's assertions, there is no evidence that the Tenth Circuit has
rejected the substance-based approach. At most, the Adams court applied a modified
version of the status-based approach, but Adams is a memorandum decision from a
federal district court. It is not a state court decision and it is not a decision from the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. This Court does not need to follow the approach taken
by the Court in Adams, especially when it is clear that the Utah Court of Appeals adopted
the substance-based approach in Youngblood.
B.

The status-based approach advocated by UAJ is
basically trial by ambush.

If this Court adopts the status-based approach and applies that approach to the
instant case, Plaintiffs treating providers will apparently be permitted to testify on
causation of injury and prognosis at trial even though they will not have been required to
disclose their opinions or establish their expertise for offering such testimony. This could
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lead to surprise testimony from experts who are not qualified to offer the opinions they
make. As stated, this will increase appellate action and cause additional confusion in trial
courts that is easily alleviated under the substance-based approach. Trial courts are the
gatekeepers of evidence. The courts cannot prevent unqualified testimony when it is not
properly disclosed prior to trial.
The alternative is for an adverse party to depose each and eveiy treating provider
designated by the injured party to determine precisely what testimony they intend to offer
and what their qualifications and expertise are for offering such testimony. In the instant
case, that would require Defendant to depose both of Plaintiff s treating providers. That
is not overly burdensome, but it is unnecessary if the treating providers just provide a
report. Moreover, there are many large personal injury and medical malpractice cases in
which numerous treating providers are designated as experts. Forcing the adverse party
in these large cases to depose each and every treating provider would be cost prohibitive,
timely, and when balanced against simply requiring those providers to provide an expert
report detailing their opinions and their qualifications for offering the opinions, it is clear
that requiring reports is the more cost efficient and time practical method of dealing with
the issue.
Of course, all of this would be easily alleviated if the treating providers of an
injured party would limit their testimony to that based on personal knowledge and
observations obtained through treatment. Adopting the status-based approach would
permit the injured party in personal injury and medical malpractice cases to designate
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treating providers as Rule 26(a)(3)(A) experts no matter what they intended to testify
about at trial, and if it was too cost prohibitive for the adverse party to depose all of the
treating providers or if there was insufficient time in the case to do so, the adverse party
would be left at a distinct disadvantage at trial. UAJ apparently believes that these
treating providers can testify about nearly anything merely because they are designated as
unretained experts. This will lead to fundamentally unfair outcomes in every case.
UAJ cites to the concern set forth in Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure with respect to "just" disposition of cases. There can nothing more "unjust"
than the status-based approach, which basically turns the expert discovery process into
trail by ambush. By simply saying that an expert is "un-retained", the expert can testify
to whatever they want, without disclosure, unless the adverse party pays to depose every
"un-retained" expert.
In the instant case, Defendant will be left at a distinct disadvantage if Plaintiff s
treating providers are permitted to offer testimony on causation of injury and prognosis
without reports detailing their opinions and qualifications for offering the opinions.
Similarly, other adverse parties in personal injury and medical malpractice cases will be
at a disadvantage when treating providers are permitted to offer testimony on virtually
any subject merely because of their status as Rule 26(a)(3)(A) un-retained experts. This
would be contrary to UAJ's assertion that Rule 26 was meant to "simplify discovery and
remove elements of surprise and trickery." (UAJ Brief, p. 14.)
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It is clear that the only just and fair way to evaluate whether an expert steps in to
the shoes of a retained expert and is required to provide a report detailing the opinions
and the foundation for those opinions is to look to the substance of the expert's
testimony. Merely looking to the expert's status will often result in a fundamentally
unfair, time consuming, and costly situation that will force adverse parties to depose all
designated treating providers who intend to testify on causation of injury and prognosis,
or anything else that is beyond the scope of their personal knowledge and observations
obtained through treatment.
H.

THERE IS NO BASIS TO UAJ'S ARGUMENT THAT UTAH
DOCTORS REFUSE TO TALK WITH PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEYS,

UAJ would like the Court to believe that plaintiffs' attorneys cannot get a report
from their clients' treating providers because the Utah Medical Insurance Association
("UMIA") tells the providers it insures not to communicate with plaintiffs' attorneys.
Basically the UAJ is advocating that this Court adopt the status-based approach because
its attorneys cannot communicate with their own experts. Therefore, experts should
apparently be allowed to testify without any disclosure. That argument of course makes
no sense. If a plaintiff has a provider who refuses to cooperate with plaintiffs counsel,
then that providers should not be testifying. In almost twenty years of practice,
appellee's counsel has yet to have a plaintiffs attorney tell him that he cannot produce an
expert report because the treating provider refuses to communicate with the attorney.
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III.

THE SUBSTANCE-BASED APPROACH DOES NOT
COMPLICATE APPLICATION OF RULE 26.

UAJ wants the court to reject the substance-based approach because it is does not
"lend itself to other areas of expertise." (UAJ Brief, p. 18.) Whether it does or does not,
the court in this case is faced with the narrow issue of whether a treating medical provider
can testify to opinions beyond the scope of the provider's treatment without providing a
Rule 26 disclosure. The Court can clearly limit its ruling to that fact scenario. Beyond
that, the substance-based approach clearly requires experts of all kinds to disclose their
opinions and foundation under Rule 26. Any burden put on plaintiffs' attorneys in
having to produce such a disclosure far outweighs the element of surprise to both the
adverse party, and the court charged with being a gate-keeper of evidence, that occurs
with the status based approach. Further, regardless of the expert's expertise, it is not
complicated to have them produce a report with their opinions and qualifications.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Tonia Mann Lee respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs treating providers must provide
Defendant with expert reports detailing their opinions on causation and prognosis and
their qualifications to make those opinions if they intend to offer opinions regarding
causation of injury and prognosis.
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